Performance-pay in public sector organisations. 
Does performance-pay enhance motivation of public sector workers? Are there undesirable effects and difficulties with introducing performance-pay in public sector organisations? Discuss the Russian case and international experience

I n public sector agencies the principal indicators are the level of accumulated experience, which is generally replaced by seniority, and accrued knowledge and skills. P ublic servants are expected to constantly improve their knowledge and skills to better match to job requirements.

P rofessionalism, in this case, knowledge of the job content, managerial and organizational skills, as well ascreativity are considered as most significant among performance indicators. T he whole process is called performance appraisal, under which employees have to demonstrate their qualification and receive testimony from the Appraisal Commission and their colleagues. It is clearly seen that the abovementioned indicators are inert by their nature and fail to promise results. N obody doubts that the effectiveness and efficiency in the performance of public servants and success of public agencies as a whole in Russiadepend onthese civil servants' qualifications and skills.

H owever, employee qualification does not ensure that employees will utilize their qualifications during the fulfillment of theirresponsibilities. H owever, these essential quantitative measurements do not show anything concerning the quality of the performance of work. The general trend of performance appraisal systemis changing orientation toward wider measurement.

M easureshave begun to include more fields of coverage, more levels. M ore management functions are being incorporated. H owever, the Russian approach to appraising public servants has remained unchanged since the Soviet times. The only toolthatpermitsconstructing some correlations between performance and pay in Russia’s public sector is grade change. A.

s discussed above, appraisal is used to measure the individual level of qualification of public servants. R esults of appraisal influence the changes in the grade of an employee. A ppraisals classify employee positions based on differences in qualifications and responsibilities, and ranks these positions into professional groups.

E ach group has a unified pay schedule and is called a grade. T here are seventeen grades in Russia’s system of salaries. T hey are very similar in all economic sectors and regions of Russia. I.

t means that there are no adjustments based the on cost-of-living analysis and differences in industries. E ach grade comprises a flat salary amount and does not encompass incremental phases inside. T.

o change the amount of income, civil servants have to get the grade change. A s discussed above, employees normallygeta grade change after an appraisal once every four years. I n practice, the employee progress thru increments is typicallyperformed automatically based on their length of service. ReferencesAdler J. P ay for performance: Is it good for public administration?

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